INTRODUCTION
Nathan Fields, an African-American employee at the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities ("OMRDD"), was in many ways the typical Title VIP employment discrimination plaintiff, with a case that, on its face, suggested both discriminatory and benign actions by his employer.2 For six years,3
Fields worked as a maintenance assistant in the electrical shop at OMRDD's Oswald D. Heck Developmental Center ("Heck"). During that time, he twice applied for a promotion, and on each occasion, Heck selected white employees for the position.4 In addition, Fields claimed that he was discriminatorily singled out for disciplinary treat ment, that he was assigned to a disfavored work shift, and that he re ceived fewer opportunities for overtime work than his white co workers. 5 Fields offered statistical evidence indicating that Heck dis proportionately assigned the tedious and difficult "ballast" work to the minority employees of the electrical shop.6 Fields's statistics also re vealed that Heck did not randomly assign job pairings in the electrical shop; rather, Heck tended to assign minorities to work with other mi norities, while disparately matching white workers with other whites. 7 Finally, Fields testified that on two or three occasions he heard white employees make racial jokes or slurs about minority co-workers.8
As is the case in many employment discrimination "disparate treatment" claims,9 however, other facts -including Fields's spotty employment record and Heck's ability to articulate legitimate, nondis criminatory reasons for many of its actions -complicated the plain tiff's claims. Fields himself acknowledged, for example, that he was poorly qualified for the promotions, and that he had accumulated 3. Heck hired Fields as a Grade 8 maintenance assistant in 1985 and promoted him to Grade 9 in 1986. Id. at 117. In 1989, Fields joined the Navy and went on military leave with out pay from Heck. Id. Fields rejoined Heck's workforce in 1992, and he filed suit against his employer in May 1994. Id. at 117, 119. Fields's lawsuit related only to actions taken by his employer after Fields's 1992 reinstatement. Id. at 117. 4. Id. at 118.
5. Id. 6. Id. 7. Id. at 119. 8. Id. 9. This Note deals solely with the type of employment discrimination cases commonly termed "disparate treatment" claims, which are distinguished from "disparate impact" cases. See lnt'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (employing terminology of "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact"); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (same). In a disparate treat ment claim, an individual plaintiff alleges that she was specifically injured by the defendant employer's discriminatory conduct. See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 1, at § 1.09 [1] . Dis parate impact claims, by contrast, deal with employers' practices that, while neutral on their face, disproportionately bar members of the plaintiff's class from a particular position or from employment altogether. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971) . See gener ally 1 LARSON, supra, at § 1.09 [1] . If an employment practice or hiring device (such as a seniority system or literacy test) is neither job related nor a business necessity, it may be found discriminatory under a disparate impact analysis. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 436; 1 LARSON, supra, at § 1.09. Disparate impact claims often are brought as class actions, and plaintiffs routinely use statistical evidence to show that the challenged employment practice has a disparate effect on members of the protected class. See generally 1 LARSON, supra, at § § 1.09 [1], 8.01[2] .
[Vol. 100:234 negative time, attendance, and performance records while at Heck. '0 In addition, Heck demonstrated that it assigned the tasks protested by Fields largely on the basis of the different levels of experience and ex pertise of each of its workers -not on the basis of the employees' races.11 The jury agreed with the defendant's explanation, returning a verdict in favor of Heck on all of Fields's claims, and the Second Cir cuit affirmed the jury's verdict on appeal.12 An examination of Fields illustrates the many problems with the current state of Title VII claims and the extent to which the Supreme Court's artificial distinctions between different standards in this con text have broken down. The trial judge in the case offered jury instruc tions that were, according to the appellate court, "needlessly confus ing. "13 The judge informed the jury that the plaintiff could prevail either (1) by proving that the defendant was animated by a "discrimi natory motive," or (2) by proving both that Heck's stated reasons for its actions were pretextual and that its real reasons were discrimina tory.14 These separate prongs derive from two distinct strains of dispa rate treatment law -what are termed "mixed-motive" and "pretext" claims. Although the trial court's instructions were not completely ac curate, the Second Circuit complicated the analysis even further by blurring the lower court's two prongs. In order to understand how the appellate court collapsed the two prongs, it is important first to ex amine the source of the trial court's distinction.
The second half of the trial court's instruction in Fields derives from the burden-shifting framework laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.15 In an ordinary McDonnell Douglas-Burdine case,16 the plaintiff first must make out a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for a job or promotion for which she applied; (3) she was rejected; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by another applicant.1 7 Once the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action.18 If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff then must demonstrate that the de fendant's proffered reason is pretextual, and that the actual motive for its actions was discriminatory.19 The Court recently indicated that, where the plaintiff has demonstrated pretext, the prima facie case it self may be sufficient evidence' froin which the jury can infer that the defendant's actual motivation was discriminatory.20
After the Court handed down its decision in 1973, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine's burden-shifting framework dominated the land scape of employment discrimination claims. In the 1980s, however, a different form of analysis emerged, as lower courts held that discrimi nation plaintiffs could establish a violation of Title VII by proving that an unlawful motive had played some role in an employment decision.21 This analysis allowed plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by pointing to naked instances of discrimination without satisfying each of the four prongs required to show pretext under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. When the circuits began to disagree over this new proof structure, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins22 -one of several notable Title VII cases during the 1989 term.23
Price Waterhouse is central to this Note for two important reasons. The decision not only recognized mixed-motive claims as a strand of disparate treatment analysis separate from McDonnell Douglas Burdine, but a concurring opinion also introduced the "direct evi dence" requirement that has created considerable confusion ever since. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court faced a case in which the employer had "mixed motives" for its challenged action -where, in other words, both legitimate and discriminatory rationales moti-18. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
19. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993 ). 20. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000 . The Court continued, however, to cite Hicks's focus on the ultimate question of discrimination, sug gesting that plaintiffs should make an additional showing of discriminatory motives -or at least rebut the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation -rather than simply rest on their prima facie case. See id.
21. See, e.g. , Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985 .
22. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 23. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that majority employees who were not parties to a consent decree between an employer and minority employees are not barred by res judicata effects from challenging employment decisions made under the consent de cree); Lorance v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the triggering event for a Title VII claim occurs when the employer engages in the allegedly discriminatory act, not when an employee first feels its effect); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989) (holding that the burden of persuasion in a disparate impact claim rests always with the plaintiff); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that § 1981 protects against discrimination only in the making and enforcement, not the perform ance, of contracts).
[Vol. 100:234 vated its decision.24 In Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, the Court held that the plaintiff bore the initial burden of showing that a dis criminatory reason was a substantial or motivating factor in the em ployment decision.25 If the plaintiff made this showing, the burden then shifted to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evi dence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not re lied on the unlawful factor (the so-called "same-decision" defense ).26 Thus, simply stated, Price Waterhouse centrally held that the defen dant in a mixed-motive case can avoid liability by prevailing on the same-decision defense.
In retrospect, a concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse is perhaps more notable than the plurality's holding. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases must present "direct evidence" that the employer placed "substantial negative reli ance on an illegitimate criterion" in reaching its decision.2 7 The lower courts quickly latched on to Justice O'Connor's wording, and, despite the fact that she offered little explanation of her terminology, the di rect evidence standard became the touchstone of mixed-motive cases.28
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA"),29 Congress responded to a handful of decisions from the Supreme Court's 1989 term, including Price Waterhouse, that many advocates viewed as hostile to civil rights -and specifically to victims of employment discrimination.30 Most important for the purposes of this Note, the CRA states that any em ployment decision in which a protected characteristic is a "motivating 24. 490 U.S. at 236-37. For a fuller discussion of Price Waterhouse, see infra Section I.A. in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of cau sation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision."). Justice O'Connor offered only the following explanation in defining her direct evidence requirement:
25.
(S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot jus tify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on le gitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmak ers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this regard.
Id. at 277 (internal citation omitted). See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1999 § 2000e-2 (1994) ). Among other amendments, the CRA added § § 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-17 (1994) ).
28.
30. See supra note 23 (listing cases and summarizing holdings); see also infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
factor" constitutes a violation of Title VIl.31 In contrast to Price Waterhouse, the CRA does not exempt from liability employers who succeed on the same-decision defense; it merely limits the damages that can be levied against them.32 The legislators failed to specify, however, whether they intended the CRA to embrace or abandon Justice O'Connor's direct evidence standard for mixed-motive cases.33
The lower courts responded to the ambiguities of Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence and the CRA by fixating on the direct evidence standard. Although only Justice O'Connor and the three dissenters agreed that plaintiffs must adduce direct evidence in order to establish a mixed-motive claim, most circuits have followed the minority in requiring direct evidence as· a threshold for mixed motive claims.34 Since embracing this standard with near uniformity, however, the courts have struggled to reach a common understanding of direct evidence in assessing mixed-motive claims.
The circuit courts currently fall into three general schools of thought with respect to the meaning of "direct evidence."35 The differ ence among the separate camps is measured by the degree of circum-
Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994) . This portion of the statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is estab lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 33. See infra Section l.C.1 (discussing legislative history).
34. The Second Circuit noted the incongruity of adopting a requirement that a majority of the Price Waterhouse Court did not endorse. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 , 1183 (2d Cir. 1992 ) ("Despite the inarguable fact that only four justices in Price Water house would have imposed a 'direct evidence' requirement for 'mixed-motives' cases, most circuits have engrafted this requirement into caselaw."). Nonetheless, "when no single ra tionale commands a majority, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.' " City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 765 n.9 (1988) (internal citation omit ted). In Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor concurred on narrower grounds than Justice White, and her opinion therefore controls. 35. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1999 REV. 959 (1994) . Since Zubrensky examined the problem in 1994, the three-way split has remained substantially the same, but the landscape has shifted, with circuit courts jumping routinely from one position to another. Although this Note offers a brief summary of the split as it currently stands, the lesson to be drawn from the circuit split is not the dif ferent approaches that the courts have adopted, but simply the degree to which the mixed motive doctrine has created confusion among the lower courts. [Vol. 100:234 stantial evidence that the courts allow to satisfy the direct evidence re quirement. The first school, sometimes termed the "classic" position, is the strictest in its definition of direct evidence.3 6 These courts re quire mixed-motive plaintiffs to present evidence that suffices to prove, without inference, presumption, or consideration of other evi dence, that a discriminatory animus motivated the defendant em ployer in the challenged employment decision.37 The second camp, called the "animus plus" position, is somewhat more generous to plaintiffs. These courts hold that direct evidence includes statements or conduct by the employer that directly reflect the alleged discrimina tory animus, and that relate precisely to the employment decision at issue.38 Under this approach, the required evidence may be either di rect or circumstantial.39 Finally, the third school, or "animus" position, requires only direct or circumstantial evidence that shows a discrimi natory animus.40 Unlike the animus-plus school, this approach does not require that the evidence bear squarely on the particular employ ment decision at issue.41
The distinction between pretext claims -those that ask the jury to infer discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine frame work -and mixed-motive claims -those that invoke Price Wa terhouse by presenting direct evidence of discrimination -only exacerbates the confusion regarding the direct evidence requirement. Because plaintiffs are unsure whether the evidence they have pro duced is "direct" enough to satisfy the particular court, they often seek 36. Fe rnandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 37. Id. The Fifth Circuit adopts this view, see, e.g. , Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207 , 1217 (5th Cir. 1995 Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) , as do the Tenth, see, e.g. , Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204 , 1207 (10th Cir. 1999 EEOC v. Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508 , 1514 (10th Cir. 1996 ), and Eleventh Circuits, see, e.g. , Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998 Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181 , 1189 (11th Cir. 1997 . But see Wright v. South land Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 , 1303 -04 (11th Cir. 1999 Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997) , and District of Columbia Circuits, see, e.g. , Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass 'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997 ), all at one point have endorsed the animus-plus position.
40. Fe rnandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 41. Id. The Second Circuit falls in this category, see, e.g. , Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir. 1997); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) , and the Seventh, see, e.g. , Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 , 1348 -50 (7th Cir. 1995 , and Eleventh Circuits, see, e.g. , Wright, 187 F.3d at 1303-04, have also shown intermittent approval of this approach.
to instruct the jury on both pretext and mixed-motive claims.42 In this way, if the evidence is held to be indirect, the plaintiff can still fall back on the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. These dual instruc tions, however, are complex, and they serve only to confuse the jury. Thus, because of the pretext/mixed-motive distinction -and because of the direct evidence muddle -the law of disparate treatment claims has become, as one commentator aptly stated, a "swamp" that makes little sense to plaintiffs, employers, academics, or the courts. 43 The Second Circuit's opinion in Fields illustrates the depth of this quagmire. After losing on his race discrimination claim against Heck at the trial court level, Fields appealed the court's jury instructions, ar guing that the CRA had abolished the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive instructions.44 The Second Circuit, however, rejected this contention, holding that the legislative history did not support Fields's interpretation.45 In a footnote, the court stated that mixed motive instructions, which it termed "dual motivation" charges, differ from pretext instructions, or "substantial motivation" charges, only in one respect: the defendant's affirmative defense that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible consideration.46 In other words, under both McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the CRA, the jury determines whether a discriminatory rationale was a moti vating factor in the employer's adverse employment action.47 A mixed motive plaintiff then faces the additional hurdle of the defendant's same-decision defense. Requesting a mixed-motive instruction is sim- 43, 65 (1993) (explaining that the issues in pretext and mixed motivation cases are so similar that "it is difficult to imagine a case that presents one but not the other"; in such cases, "there is little in the way of legal doctrine that saves the jury from confusing instructions on the arcane distinction between pretext and mixed motivation"); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 603-04 (1996) (stating that, if the dichotomy continues to exist, "judges will be hard pressed to create jury instructions that make sense") (hereinafter Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure). 
See id.
(Vol. 100:234 ply "shorthand," the court said, for requesting an additional instruc tion concerning the same-decision defense.48
As the following discussion illustrates, Congress and the Price Wa terhouse Court thought they lowered the McDonnell Douglas Burdine bar by allowing a class of discrimination plaintiffs to bypass the complex burden-shifting scheme and jump straight to the "moti vating factor" test. Stated differently, where a plaintiff could demon strate discriminatory animus without relying on an inference from pre text, Congress intended to enable her to establish the defendant's liability simply by showing that the animus was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. Fields frustrates this effort by compressing the complex McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme into a simple moti vating factor test49 while leaving an additional obstacle -the same decision defense -in the path of mixed-motive plaintiffs. The result is a paradox that directly contradicts congressional intent.
Even as it insists that the CRA did not erase the distinction be tween pretext and mixed-motive claims, the Fields court nonetheless uses the motivating factor analysis to inform its understanding ofindeed, to simplify -McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext claims. With pretext and mixed-motive claims now measured in the Second Circuit by the same motivating factor standard, Fields concludes that only mixed-motive plaintiffs, not pretext plaintiffs, must overcome a same-decision showing by the defendant. Thus, although Congress in tended to use the motivating factor test to make discrimination claims easier for mixed-motive plaintiffs,5° Fields actually makes it easier for plaintiffs to succeed in pretext cases than in mixed-motive cases. The Second Circuit is hardly to blame for this absurd development, since it was merely trapped on the tortuous path forged by the Court, by Congress, and by other lower courts. Thus far, the Court has made no effort to clear the muddle, leaving parties, attorneys, judges, and juries hopelessly confused.51
This Note argues that courts should jettison their efforts to under stand the arcane pretext/mixed-motive distinction and should focus in- Jan. 1999, 34, 37 ("If all this seems unwieldy to lawyers, consider the problems in fashioning comprehensi ble instructions for juries. As the courts struggle to make the law coherent, appellate chal lenges to jury instructions have become commonplace.").
stead on the question at the heart of every discrimination case: the motives of the employer.52 Part I discusses the Court's decision in Price Waterhouse, then turns to the plain language of the CRA to ar gue that the statute's text requires abandoning the pretext/mixed motive distinction. Part I also examines the legislative history of the CRA and concludes that, because Congress's intent is highly ambigu ous, the text of the statute best guides courts' understandings of the Act. Part II proposes a set of jury instructions consistent with the spirit of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the text of the CRA. These in structions clear the mixed-motive muddle for juries and make the par ties' task in employment discrimination cases more apparent from the outset. Part II explains that these instructions are grounded in the text of Title VII, and that they represent an extension of efforts by courts and scholars to simplify this area of the law. By making this inquiry the touchstone for analyzing individual disparate treatment claims, courts can devise a simple standard that allows parties on both sides of the employment relationship to conform their behavior with the law. The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse crystallized the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims under Title VII. Section I.A examines the decision and provides a context for Congress's reaction to the case two years later in the CRA. This Sec tion reveals that a majority of the Court did not agree that direct evi dence should be the touchstone in mixed-motive cases, and that the opinion provides little guidance for the lower courts.
The facts of Price Waterhouse illustrate the dual motivations that typically exist in mixed-motive claims. Ann Hopkins had worked for five years at Price Waterhouse's Office of Government Services when she was nominated for partnership.s4 Hopkins was highly qualified for the position: other partners in the office described her as "an out standing professional" with "strong character, independence, and in tegrity," and they praised her "key role" in landing a multimillion dollar contract with the State Department.ss But Hopkins's co-workers sometimes perceived her aggressive style as abrasive and brusque, and even the partners who supported her candidacy admitted that she was sometimes impatient and unduly harsh.s6
As the Price Waterhouse plurality noted, however, there were signs that some partners reacted negatively to Hopkins's aggressive person ality because she was a woman.s 7 Some of the partners, for example, felt that she "overcompensated for being a woman" by acting "ma cho," and that she needed to take "a course at charm school."s8 As a result, the Policy Board placed Hopkins's candidacy on hold, advising her that to improve her chances she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."s9 In assessing Hopkins's discrimination claim, Justice Brennan, writing for the four-justice plurality, began by examining the language of Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual "because of" his or her race, color, religion, sex, or na tional origin.60 Justice Brennan concluded that the "because of" lan guage means that sex "must be irrelevant to employment decisions."61 In other words, Title VII condemns even those employment decisions that are based on legitimate considerations if an impermissible factor was also considered.62
Given that a Title VII violation exists whenever the employer has considered a protected characteristic, the plurality then laid out its two-part mixed-motive analysis. First, the plaintiff must show that the protected characteristic -in Price Waterhouse, sex -"played a moti vating part" in the challenged employment decision.63 Once the plain tiff discharges this burden, the employer can present an affirmative de fense and "avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role."64 Thus, this affirmative defense, which has come to be called the "same-decision defense,"65 allows the employer to escape liability altogether by showing that leaving the unlawful variable out of the equation would not have changed the final outcome.
The plurality opinion made clear that plaintiffs retain a degree of flexibility in bringing mixed-motive claims. Justice Brennan stated in a footnote that a plaintiff's case need not be pigeonholed from the be ginning as either a pretext or a mixed-motives case.66 Rather, the dis trict court can wait until some point after discovery before it decides, based on all the evidence presented, whether the case involves mixed motives.6 7 Justice Brennan also indicated that he saw no meaningful 274, 286-87 (1977) , where the Court held that once a plaintiff has shown that an exercise of a First Amendment liberty was a "substantial" or "motivating factor" in an adverse employment decision, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of such protected conduct. This framework has also been employed by the Court in the context of protected labor conduct, see NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) , and where unconsti tutional motives allegedly contributed to the enactment of legislation, see Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) . Pointing to these previous cases, Justice Brennan concluded that mixed-motive analysis constitutes "a well-worn path." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. Vol. 100:234 difference between the level of proof required by the plurality and that required by Justice O'Connor.68 Responding to Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which required direct evidence of discrimi nation to trigger the mixed-motive analysis, the plurality noted that it was not suggesting "a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision." 69 Justice Brennan also refrained from deciding "which specific facts, 'standing alone,' would or would not establish a plaintiff's case .... "70 In other words, the plurality declined to limit the nature of proof re quired in mixed-motive cases to "direct evidence," but instead left available to plaintiffs a range of evidence that could be adduced to support an employee's case.
Justice White's concurrence71 reveals that a majority of the Price Waterhouse Court -the four-justice plurality and Justice Whitedid not require direct evidence in order to trigger mixed-motive analy sis.72 In Justice White's view, the Court should simply look to Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,73 which employed a "sub stantial" or "motivating factor" test, in devising a mixed-motive test for the employment context. His concurrence made no reference to the nature of evidence required of the plaintiff. Justice White did, however, state that a broad range of evidence could be introduced by the defendant in proving the same-decision defense, indicating that he did not wish to restrict parties in employment discrimination cases to certain types of evidence. 74
Like Justice White, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to make out a same-decision defense.75 Justice O'Connor noted that the mixed- 72. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 , 1183 (2d Cir. 1992 ) ("The re quirement of 'direct evidence' was not ... adopted either by the plurality of four or by Jus tice White, so there was not majority support for this proposition."). But see supra note 34.
73. 429 U.S. 247, 287 (1977) . Mt. Healthy applied the mixed-motive framework to em ployment decisions motivated by an employee's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights. See supra note 64 (explaining the application of the mixed-motive analysis in various contexts).
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This Note does not aim to provide a detailed analysis of Justice O'Connor's concurrence; other commentators have exhaustively com pleted this task. For the most thorough account, see Tindall, supra note 52. See also Ward , supra note 52; Zubrensky, supra note 35. Rather, this Note briefly summarizes Justice O'Connor's concurrence in order to shed light on the fact that the lower courts have incor rectly applied the direct evidence requirement, converting mixed-motive analysis into a quagmire that most plaintiffs opt to circumvent. motive framework laid out by the Court should be considered a "sup plement" to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting scheme.76 Employing slightly different rhetoric from the plurality, Jus tice O'Connor stated that once the plaintiff has established that a dis criminatory animus was a "substantial factor" in its decision, the de fendant may be required to show that "despite the smoke, there is no fire."77 In other words, the plaintiff cannot simply infer a discrimina tory animus from "discrimination in the air."78 Instead, the plaintiff must, as in a tort case, show causation -that the defendant's imper missible consideration of a protected characteristic proximately caused the adverse employment decision.79
Justice O'Connor departed from the plurality, however, in requir ing a specific nature of evidence in mixed-motive cases. In her view, the plaintiff must present "direct evidence" that an impermissible con sideration was a substantial factor in the employer's decision in order to shift the burden to the defendant.80 Justice O'Connor explained that the "strong showing of illicit motivation" she would require could not consist merely of "stray remarks in the workplace" or "statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself. "81 Beyond this negative definition, however, Justice O'Connor offered no precise delineation of her "direct evidence" terminology.
The direct evidence requirement perplexes the lower courts, who inconsistently apply it. 82. Justice Kennedy, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, presciently predicted, "[t)oday the Court manipulates existing and complex rules for em ployment discrimination cases in a way certain to result in confusion." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He added: "Courts will also be required to make the often subtle and difficult distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstan tial evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Addition of a second burden-shifting mechanism ... is not likely to lend clarity to the process." Id. at 291. The dissenters argued that the existing McDonnell Douglas frame work could adequately accommodate mixed-motive claims such as Hopkins's without creat ing a new burden-shifting structure. See id. at 286-87.
83. See, e.g. , Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 , 1183 (2d Cir. 1992 ) ("The requirement of 'direct evidence' was not ... adopted either by the plurality or by Justice White, so there was not majority support for this proposition."). But see supra note 34.
Justice O'Connor did not mean "direct evidence" in the traditional, strict meaning of the term,84 but rather implied a broader connotation of the term that includes circumstantial evidence tied closely to the ac tual employment decision in question.BS Regardless of what Justice O'Connor meant by "direct evidence,'' Price Waterhouse remains rife with ambiguity.B6 Thus, Section I.B proposes abandoning the decision's unclear language in favor of a more straightforward text -the CRA.
B. Th e Plain Language of the Civil Rights Act
This Section recommends avoiding the muddle created in Price Waterhouse by adhering to Congress's plain language. It begins by de scribing the events that prompted enactment of the CRA and then analyzes the text itse1f.B7 It concludes by offering the CRA's legislative history as a justification for textual fidelity. 40 (1935) (explaining that the term "has no utility" because it is "sometimes used to mean testimonial evidence in general, but sometimes also limited to apply only to testimony di rectly asserting the fact-in-issue").
85. See Tindall, supra note 52, at 354 ("From the clues in her opinion, it seems that when Justice O'Connor required direct evidence she meant evidence of a decisionmaker's words that show animus toward the plaintiff's protected class which is related to the adverse em ployment decision."). This comports more with the reading adopted by the courts in the animus-plus camp than with the classic view. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
86. Cf. Thomas v. Nat'! Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F. 3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1997 ) ("As an initial matter, it should be noted that Justice O'Connor's concurrence was one of six votes supporting the Court's judgment ... so that it is far from clear that Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which no other Justice joined, should be taken as establishing prece dent. Justice White's concurring opinion makes no mention of 'direct' evidence, nor does the plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan." (citations omitted)).
87. See generally William N. Eskridge, The New Te xtualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 (1990) ("The statute's text is the most important consideration in statutory interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given effect.").
88. See supra note 23 (citing cases and stating holdings).
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
90. Prior to Wards Cove, the burden of persuasion in disparate impact cases, see supra note 9, rested initially with the plaintiff. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) . Once the plaintiff proved that a disparate impact was caused by a facially neutral held that § 1981, which protects against racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, does not bar discrimination in the performance of contracts.92
Congress reacted quickly to these decisions. Within a year, legisla tors introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which they termed an "omnibus legislative response to judicial interpretations of Title VII."93 One of the Act's chief purposes was to "respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protec tions that were dramatically limited by those decisions."94 With these statements, Congress expressly declared that Price Waterhouse and its companion decisions motivated the legislation.
Despite its rapid start, the proposed bill quickly became controver sial, and passage proved difficult.95 The business community in par ticular launched a stiff resistance to the legislation, and President Bush vetoed the first 1990 version of the bill.96 After Congress incorporated the compromise provisions demanded by the White House,97 President Bush signed the legislation, which went into effect in 1991.98 employment device, the burden shifted to the defendant to show that the challenged practice was both job related and a business necessity -i.e., that the device was essential for the em ployer to be able to identify qualified employees. Id. Wards Cove altered this analysis by holding that the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. 490 U.S. at 659. Wards Cove also weakened the business necessity requirement, stating that "there is no re quirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business to pass muster." Id. § 1981 (1994) , protects the right to make and enforce contracts without discrimination on the basis of race or ancestry. See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 101.01. Civil rights activists viewed Patterson as particularly pernicious because of the effect it had among the lower courts, which interpreted the decision to mean that any conduct by the employer after the formation of the contract -including termination and retaliation -could not be covered by § 1981. The CRA instituted a number of major reforms in employment discrimination law. Most notably, the Act made jury trials and com pensatory and punitive damages available for claims of alleged inten tional discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with Disabili ties Act.99 The Act also overturned Wards Cove, establishing that when a plaintiff proves that an employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, the employer must show that the practice is both job related and a business necessity.100 The CRA also over turned Patterson by amending § 1981 to prohibit racial discrimination in the performance of contracts.101 Congress responded to Price Waterhouse in two principal portions of the CRA, which the following Section examines.
Th e Te xt
Two provisions of the 1991 Act stand at the center of this Note. First, § 2000e-2(m) (the "motivating factor provision") codifies the motivating factor test that a majority of the Price Wa terhouse Court endorsed:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employ ment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.1 02
This section of the statute makes clear that an employer violates Title VII whenever it considers an illicit reason in its decision process, irre spective of whether it would have made the same decision absent the illegal consideration. In this respect, the CRA substantially comports with Price Wa terhouse's holding.
The Act goes on, however, to depart from Price Wa terhouse in not allowing employers to escape entirely from liability by explaining that they would have made the same decision absent the impermissible consideration. Under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (the "same-decision provi sion"),103 if the defendant succeeds on the same-decision defense, the plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement, back pay, or compensatory or punitive damages. A plaintiff who has successfully shown liability un der the motivating factor provision, however, does receive declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs, regardless of the defendant's success on the same-decision defense.'04 Thus, while Congress essentially ratified Price Wa terhouse's structure with respect to the plaintiff's burden in establishing the defendant's liability, it overturned the decision to the extent that it allowed employers com pletely to escape liability with the affirmative defense.
In the task of statutory construction, many judges and scholars hold that the text, not the illusory intent of the legislature, controls in terpretation.105 At its broadest level, the "textualist" approach follows the maxim of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote, "[w]e do not in quire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."106 Although this quotable passage expresses the sentiment of textualists generally, it does not accurately reflect the views of all who claim that a statute's text is paramount in its interpretation.
Long before Justice Antonin Scalia's views rose to prominence, courts practiced a fidelity to statutes' language that some scholars now term "traditional" textualism.107 Under the traditional approach, a statute's "plain meaning" governed "its interpretation, unless negated by strongly contradictory legislative history."108 In other words, where a statute was unambiguous, the court followed its plain meaning. In the event of ambiguous language, however, legislative history could control the decision.109 Indeed, legislative history could even trump statutory language that appeared on its face to be plainly to the con trary.110 Instead of attempting to divine meaning from the actions of inde pendently minded legislators, then, the new textualists maintain that the interpreter of a statute should focus on the context of the legisla tion and the meaning that the statute's language carried at the time it was enacted.116 The new textualists also strive to accord their reading of a statute with the surrounding body of law in which it is located.11 7 The new textualists deviate from the statutory language only when "literally" interpreting the statute would produce "an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result."118 Stated differently, the new textu- 413, 438 (1996) ("Consider that each legislator possesses a complex mix of hopes, expectations, beliefs, and attitudes. It is not obvious which of these mental states, or combination of them, constitutes her essential intent for legislation.").
115. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 32 ("[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of con struction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent," because, "[f]or a virtual cer tainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the ex istence of the issue, much less had any preference as to how it should be resolved.").
116. See SCALIA, supra note 105, at 37; see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). he statutory text itself may contain inconsistencies and ambiguities that require resolution. But for the textualist, such difficulties are resolved through careful consideration of the statutory structure as a whole and the relationship be tween the particular statutory provision and the rest of the legislatively enacted code." (in ternal citations omitted)).
118. Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
alists look to a statute's legislative history only when its plain language suggests a strangled meaning that the legislature could not have meant, either as a matter of common sense or as a matter of constitu tional principles.119
This Note argues that both modes of interpretation -the tradi tional and the new textualism -command an approach to disparate treatment claims that the courts have not followed. The new textual ists, of course, would look to the CRA's text and no further, unless the resulting understanding of the statute was preposterous or unconstitu tional. According to the plain language of the motivating factor provi sion, an employer violates Title VII anytime it allows a protected characteristic to serve as a "motivating factor" in an employment deci sion. The text draws no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, or between pretext and mixed-motive claims. Rather, it speaks in plain terms, suggesting that a motivating factor test controls all discrimination claims. Thus, reading the CRA's provisions as cre ating a uniform approach to disparate treatment claims -a motivat ing factor test -is neither absurd nor unconstitutional.
At least one court to have contemplated the possibility that the text of the CRA erases the pretext/mixed-motive distinction, however, disagrees with this conclusion. In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,120 the Third Circuit considered both the text and the legislative history of the 1991 Act and concluded that the Act did not erase the pretext/mixed-motive distinction. The Watson court began its analysis by examining the text of the motivating factor provi sion, which it read as a reaction to Price Waterhouse.121 The court noted that the section prohibits any employment decision in which a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, "even though other factors also motivated this practice."122 The quoted language, the Watson court stated, suggests that Congress intended to target specifi cally those cases in which multiple factors motivated the defendant To be sure, the textualist approach is not without its critics. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at 115; Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at 95; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at 65. Some empirical evidence suggests that the new textualism simply does not work as promised. See, e.g., James P. [Vol. 100:234 (i.e., mixed-motive cases); otherwise, it simply would have spoken in broad terms without bothering to insert the superfluous language.123 The court also stated that the use of the term "demonstrates" in the motivating factor provision correlates with Justice O'Connor's use of the same term in her Price Waterhouse concurrence -a correlation too close to be coincidental.124
The Watson court offered further support for its conclusion that the pretext/mixed-motive distinction remains intact after the CRA. Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (the same-decision provision) limits the damages available against a defendant that, though liable under the motivating factor provision, can show it would have reached the same decision absent the impermissible consideration.125 The Third Circuit in Watson noted that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)'s affirmative defense is avail able only where the defendant is liable under the motivating factor provision -not under § 2000e-2(a), the general disparate treatment provision that defines unlawful employment practices by employers.126 If Congress intended to create a new standard of causation for all in dividual disparate claims, the court reasoned, it would have drafted the same-decision provision to apply to all such cases, not simply those under the motivating factor provision.127 Thus, because claims under the motivating factor provision entail their own special defense, they must differ inherently from claims under the general disparate treat ment provision.
The conclusions in Watson, though insightful, do not undermine the new textualist reasoning this Note adopts. The Watson court sug gested that Congress intended in the CRA to address only those cases in which multiple factors, not just a discriminatory animus, motivated the employer, suggesting that the bulk of cases would still fall under the general disparate treatment provision ( § 2000e-2(a)). In the mod ern workplace, however, an employer is rarely motivated solely by a discriminatory impulse. Rather, an amalgam of factors, both conscious 123. Watson, 207 F.3d at 217. 124. Id. Justice O'Connor used the word "demonstrates" throughout her opinion. E.g. , Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (charac terizing case as one in which "the employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an il legitimate factor played a substantial role"); id. at 276-77 ("[The employer] must demon strate that with the illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business reasons would have induced it to take the same employment action."). The Watson court called these passages "key portions" of Justice O'Connor's opinion, Watson, 207 F.3d at 217, but in the places where she stated her central holding, Justice O'Connor used different terminology. See, e.g. , Price Wa terhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Under my ap proach, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor .... " (emphasis added)). Thus, the Third Circuit's analysis is strained.
See supra note 103 (quoting the text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
126. Watson, 207 F.3d at 218.
Id.
and unconscious, often explains a discriminatory employment deci sion.128 The CRA may simply recognize that it is increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to show that a discriminatory animus was the singular reason for their dismissal (or nonpromotion, etc.). Rather than sup planting the general disparate treatment provision, then, Congress supplemented that provision with one that recognizes the evolving na ture of discrimination cases. The old provision remains available for plaintiffs who choose to use it, but the new one can be used by both "pretext" and "mixed-motive" plaintiffs.
From the new textualist perspective, the principal problem with Watson is that the court attempted to discern Congress's intent from the language it used rather than examining the language on its own terms. On its face, the motivating factor provision does not limit itself to mixed-motive cases; it simply includes cases where multiple factors motivated the employer.129 And although new textualists look to the structure of a statute to determine whether a reading of its language is excessively strained, the Watson court's structural arguments do not defeat this Note's textualist reading. The fact that the same-decision defense is attached only to the motivating factor provision and not to the general disparate treatment provision means nothing. If Congress anticipated that the motivating factor provision would be used princi pally by mixed-motive plaintiffs, then it logically would have attached the same-decision defense only to that provision, rather than also al tering the general disparate treatment provision. That legislative deci sion by no means requires that § 2000e-2(m) be used exclusively by mixed-motive plaintiffs. Thus, the Wa tson court's arguments do not sufficiently demonstrate that reading the CRA as creating a uniform motivating factor standard for all disparate treatment claims is some how absurd or unconstitutional.
This Note does not stop, however, with a new textualist interpreta tion. Good sense counsels that, in addition to the plain text, a glance at 128. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52, at 1039 (recognizing "the causal relationship between the legitimate and discriminatory motives" and explaining that "fact finders may have difficulty seeing that the discriminatory motive may indeed have directly contributed to the 'legitimate' motive, where the latter is, for example, the deterioration of the plaintiff's performance"). Some scholars, including Bisom-Rapp, have suggested that the causal rela tionship between "legitimate" and "discriminatory" motives merits jettisoning an intent based approach to discrimination claims. Bisom-Rapp, supra, at 1()40 (recommending the abandonment of the same-decision text in favor of an approach that examines overall evi dence of discrimination, irrespective of employer claims); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1161-66 (1995) (arguing that current dis parate treatment theory is inadequate because it assumes that discrimination is motivational, rather than cognitive, in origin).
129. For the language of the motivating factor provision, see supra text accompanying note 102.
[Vol. 100:234 legislative history may occasionally be merited.13° Thus, this Note also employs the methods of traditional textualism, considering the lan guage of the CRA in light of its history in order to determine, if possi ble, Congress's intentions in enacting the statute. As the following Section indicates, the ambiguity of this legislative history provides ad ditional support for abiding by the plain language of the CRA.
C. Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act
According to the traditional textualist approach, unless the history of the CRA points in another direction, the text of the statute sets forth a simple motivating factor test that controls all Title VII individ ual disparate treatment claims. This Section turns to that history in or der to determine the changes Congress intended to effect in enacting the motivating factor provision. In light of the decidedly ambiguous legislative history, this Section concludes that the textualist reading outlined above, which does not include the direct evidence require ment, is not inconsistent with Congress's intent. The Section next con siders Congress's intentions with respect to the continued distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims, again concluding that the vague statutory history does not preclude elimination of the distinc tion.
Legislative History of the Direct Evidence Requirement
An examination of the legislative history of the CRA reveals that Congress was largely silent regarding Justice O'Connor's direct evi dence requirement. That silence, however, is not the only puzzling as pect of the statute's history. Although the CRA headlined the legisla tive agenda in 1990 and 1991, little traditional legislative history accompanies the Act.131 As was the case with the original passage of Title VII in 1964, the 1991 Act was a quickly adopted compromise that followed extended debate over prior drafts, with few committee hearings or reports and little floor debate on the final version.132
130. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) ("The decisions of this Court have repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute, for 'literalness may strangle meaning.' " (citations omitted)).
131. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 7.
132. See id. Cathcart explains that three primary sources of legislative history exist for the CRA: (1) the CRA of 1990; (2) various interpretative memoranda entered into the Congressional Record by Senators and Representatives; and (3) a three-paragraph Interpre tive Memorandum entered by Senator Danforth, providing, "[n]o statements other than the interpretive memorandum ... shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove -Business necessity/cumulation/alternative practice." Id. at 7-8 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. S15276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum)).
Moreover, the legislative history that does exist focuses heavily on provisions of the Act not pertinent to this Note, with less attention paid to Price Waterhouse and the provision that affects it - § 2000e-2(m). In those areas in which the legislators discuss mixed-motive analysis, they mention a requirement of direct evidence only once, and that cursory remark is hardly dispositive. As a result, combing the leg islative history to discern Congress's intent regarding direct evidence becomes largely a task of inference from silence.133
Although the legislators failed to articulate precisely what kind of evidence they would require of mixed-motive plaintiffs, the legislative history suggests that they did not intend for the requirement to be as stringent as some circuits have demanded. In the Conference Report accompanying the 1990 Act, the Conferees expressed their intention "to restore the rule applied by the majority of circuits prior to the Price Waterhouse decision that any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may be the subject of liability."134 The Conferees went on to state: This "stray remarks" language seems to mirror Justice O'Connor's negative definition of direct evidence,136 indicating that Congress may have intended to codify such a requirement in the motivating factor provision. Some courts, however, also hold that stray remarks are in sufficient proof of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas Burdine model.13 7 Thus, the Conferees may simply have intended to require the same nature of proof in all employment discrimination cases, without setting a higher standard in cases under the motivating factor provision than existed under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine.
133. Other commentators have noted Congress's silence -or at least its ambiguityregarding the direct evidence requirement under the CRA. See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 52, at 750-51 ("Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence to show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff may offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or circumstantial, under the mo tivating factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.").
134. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 18-19 (1990 Ms. NORTON: There has to be direct evidence of a motivating factor.
Thoughts are no more evidence in a mixed-motive case than they are in a single-motive case.
THE CHAIRMAN: All right.139
As opaque as this passage appears, one could argue that Norton's tes timony at least provided notice to the legislators that plaintiffs bring ing suit under the new statute would be required to adduce direct evi dence.
For a variety of reasons, however, Norton's statements do not indi cate a congressional intent to codify Justice O'Connor's direct evi dence requirement. First, it is not at all clear from her remarks what Norton meant by "direct evidence," because she, like Justice O'Connor, failed to define the term. Indeed, it is probable that the Professor, like the lower courts, had no clear understanding of Justice O'Connor's terminology, and that she was merely invoking the par lance that had gained favor among the lower courts.140 Second, Senator Kennedy's apparent acquiescence to Norton's explanation of the di rect evidence requirement does not indicate that he understood what the requirement meant -much less that he intended to codify it into law. Rather, taken in context, Senator Kennedy's response is best un- 140. It is worth noting that Norton's testimony -and the Senate Hearings in generalfollowed soon after Price Waterhouse was handed down. It may be safe to assume that at this time the lower courts had not had sufficient opportunity to engraft the direct evidence re quirement into case law. Rather, Norton was likely referring to the direct evidence standard that some courts had required in mixed-motive cases before Price Wa terhouse was decided. E.g., Terbovitz v. Fiscal Ct. of Adair County, Ky., 825 F.2d 111, 115-16 (6th Cir. 1987). derstood as signaling satisfaction with Norton's rebuttal of the argu ment that the statute would police thoughts. The Chairman's own comments in separate portions of the legislative history give no hint that he -or, for that matter, any of his colleagues -intended to codify the direct evidence requirement.141 Professor Norton's remarks thus provide little support for any finding of congressional intent.
Several factors may explain Congress's failure explicitly to address the nature of proof that plaintiffs must adduce to trigger the motivat ing factor provision. First, although Price Wa terhouse was one of the major cases of the Supreme Court's 1989 term that Congress targeted in the CRA, the legislators devoted more of their energies to other portions of the statute.142 It is entirely feasible that the legislators chose to allocate more of their time and political resources to the amendments related, for example, to the availability of jury trials un der Title VIl143 or the burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases144 than to obscure language in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
A second possible explanation for the congressional silence on the issue of direct evidence is that the legislators were more concerned with the allocation of liability under Price Waterhouse than they were with methods of proof. Congress's primary aim in overturning the Court's decision was to ensure that remedies remain available to plaintiffs even where the employer succeeds on the same-decision de fense.145 In other words, Congress had no desire to tamper with the burden-shifting structure of mixed-motive claims made available by Price Waterhouse; it simply wanted to expand the availability of relief. Because the plurality's decision with respect to shifting burdens satis fied the legislators, they saw no need to address the nature-of-proof requirement.
141. In his opening statement, for example, Senator Kennedy remarked that an em ployee is entitled to relief when he or she "demonstrates that prejudice actually motivated an employment decision." Hearings, supra note 138, at 102. The Senator later added that: the burden falls on the plaintiff to show that a discriminatory motivation actually contrib uted -was a motivating factor -in the decision, and has to demonstrate that and has to prove it. If they aren't able to prove it, then we are not dealing with what this particular pro vision provided. They have to prove it.
Id. at 116. Nowhere did the Chairman mention the nature of proof that the bill required.
142. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 14-15 (explaining that the section of the statute related to disparate impact and business necessity attracted the bulk of the legisla tors' attention).
143. Cf. id. at 9 (arguing that the CRA's introduction of jury trials is perhaps its "most significant aspect," because it "fundamentally changes the legal model underlying federal employment discrimination Jaws").
144. See id. at 14-15 ("No other section of the Act generated as much controversy and attracted as much attention as that which addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove .... [T] he measures relating to the disparate impact analysis formed the basis for prot estations from the Bush Administration." (citations omitted)).
145. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-856, at 18 (1990) ; see also Hearings, supra note 138, at 102 (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy).
[Vol. 100:234 Finally, it is possible that the direct evidence requirement simply had not gained common currency by the time Congress drafted the motivating factor provision. The motivating factor provision was drafted as part of the doomed Civil Rights Act of 1990, and its lan guage, with only one exception,146 remained largely intact in the 1991 Act. Thus, the portion of the Act dealing with mixed-motive claims was drafted rather soon after Price Waterhouse was handed down in the summer of 1989. At the time, it may not have been foreseeableexcept, perhaps, to Professor Norton -that the courts would engraft the direct evidence requirement into the case law.14 7
Given the silence in the legislative history on the matter of direct evidence, Congress likely gave little thought to Justice O'Connor's concurrence. This Note concludes that the legislators assumed that plaintiffs bringing suit under the motivating factor provision would be able to adduce both direct and circumstantial evidence in proving their case.148 The following Section reveals that, like the legislative history regarding the direct evidence requirement, the record concerning the continued distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims suffers from a marked vagueness. Both areas of confusion, therefore, should be clarified by reference to the plain language of the statute.
Legislative Intent and the Pretext/Mixed-Motive Distinction
Although commentators have read some lower court decisions as ruling that the CRA erased the confusing distinction between pretext claims under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and mixed-motive claims,149
146. As drafted, the CRA of 1990 initially prohibited any decision in which a protected characteristic was a "contributing factor." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-755, at 4 (1990) . Even tually the legislators replaced "contributing factor" with "motivating factor." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 4 (1990) .
147. See supra note 140.
148. Other commentators have reached this conclusion. See Davis, supra note 52, at 750-51 ("Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence to show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff may offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or circumstantial, under the motivat ing factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."); Harold S. Lewis, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Continued Dominance of the Disparate Treatment Conception of Equality, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992) ("Whether plaintiff's initial proof takes the form of 'direct' anecdotal testimony of discriminatory motive; substantial ... evidence ... ; or simply the more common 'inferential' formula, the employer must demonstrate 'that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor' .... " (citations omitted)). , 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) , and Allen v. City of Athens, 937 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1996 , as holding that the 1991 Act eliminated the pretext/mixed motive distinction. But a close reading reveals that Haase misapprehends these cases. In the O'Day passage cited by Haase, the court makes clear that it is discussing only mixed-motive claims, O'Day, 79 F.3d at 760-61, and the Allen court separately assessed the plaintiff's evi-no circuit has clearly and consistently held that the Act had such an effect. This Note argues that the plain language of the statute can be read as having eliminated the division between pretext and mixed motive -a conclusion that the legislative history does not preclude. Some circuit courts, however, disagree with this assessment.150 Section l.B.2 above refuted the text-based arguments in Wa tson v. Southeast ern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,151 which held that the dis tinction remains intact after the CRA.152 This Section considers that decision's holding regarding the pretext/mixed-motive distinction and demonstrates that the court's analysis does not mandate the conclu sion drawn in that case.
In addition to its textual analysis, the Watson court examined the legislative history of the CRA and concluded that Congress intended to preserve the division between pretext and mixed-motive claims. The court cited various portions of the congressional reports and hearings indicating that the motivating factor provision's primary pur pose was to overturn Price Waterhouse's liability holding.153 In support of its interpretation, the court cited dicta in Landgraf v. US! Film Products,154 where the Supreme Court stated that the motivating factor provision responds to Price Waterhouse "by setting forth standards applicable in 'mixed motive' cases."155 Additionally, the Watson court concluded that interpreting the CRA as eliminating the confusing dis tinction would not simplify employment discrimination law,156 noting that other tests, such as the "determinative factor" standard in Title VII retaliation cases, would continue to exist in different contexts.
The legislative history arguments in Watson are weak at best. The court's finding that the motivating factor provision was conceived pri marily as a response to Price Waterhouse is sound; the legislative his tory is unambiguous on this point.15 7 Simply because Congress in tended for the provision to overturn Price Waterhouse in the mixed- (Vol. 100:234 motive context, however, does not mean that it wished for the moti vating factor test to be available only to mixed-motive plaintiffs. In other words, Congress may have contemplated that the motivating factor provision, while targeted primarily at Price Waterhouse, would have broader implications.158 Moreover, most courts and scholars who have considered the issue disagree with the Wa tson court's conclusion that eliminating the distinction would not simplify employment dis crimination law.159 Juries seem better equipped to apply separate tests for discrete claims -for example, motivating factor for a race dis crimination claim and determining factor for an accompanying retalia tion claim -than to consider different standards -i.e., McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the motivating factor provision -for the same claim.160
By now the irony should be clear: the lower federal courts gleaned a direct evidence requirement from a single concurring opinion in a case that Congress expressly rejected, and they subsequently grafted that requirement onto the very statutory provision that overturned the decision. Based on an analysis of the statute's text and legislative his tory, this Part concludes that courts should turn to the text of the stat ute as their touchstone in resolving the considerable confusion sur rounding individual employment discrimination claims. Part II carries that textualist analysis a step further in seeking to clarify the current law for practitioners and courts.
II. NAVIGATING THE "SWAMP" IN PRACTICE:
TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE -AND COMPREHENSIBLE -JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
Individual employment discrimination law currently manifests two heads -pretext and mixed-motive -that emanate from the same body of law -Title VII. This Part returns to that body of law to fashion a set of jury instructions that can be used in all individual dis parate treatment cases, regardless of whether the claim would tradi tionally have been classified as pretext or mixed-motive. Section II.A then explains that the proposed model instructions are supported by the text and spirit of the CRA, and Section 11.B locates support for the instructions in court decisions and other commentary.
158. Cf Zimmer, Emerging Unifo rm Structure, supra note 42, at 604-05 (arguing that the motivating factor provision has implications beyond mixed-motive claims).
159. See supra notes 42, 51, infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion created by the current division between pretext and mixed-motive cases).
160. Cf. Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 603-04 (reaching a similar conclusion).
A. Proposed Jury Instructions for Disparate Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases
This Section argues that a single set of instructions for both pretext and mixed-motive claims would greatly clarify this muddled area of the law, and it turns to the language of the CRA for guidance in de vising these instructions. The Act provides a valuable starting point in large part because it eschews the direct evidence requirement. Under current law, a discrimination plaintiff reaches the end of trial unsure what "direct evidence" means, or at least uncertain whether she meets the threshold that will satisfy the particular panel she may draw on appeal.161 Thus faced with the possibility that she will lose her mixed motive claim for lack of sufficiently direct evidence, the plaintiff re quests that the jury be instructed under both the mixed-motive and the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine modes of analysis.162
This Section proposes resolving the problem of dual instructions by jettisoning the division between pretext and mixed-motive in favor of a single motivating factor test. The Section derives this test largely from the text of the CRA's motivating factor provision, coupled with the Act's same-decision provision. Using the CRA as a model, this Note proposes the following set of instructions for use in disparate treatment cases:
In light of all of the evidence that has been presented, was the plaintiff's 161. Cf Robyn S. Hankins, Whose Burden Is It, Anyway? The 11th Circuit's Evolving Standard fo r "Burden-Shifting " in Employment Discrimination Cases, FLA. BAR J., Mar. 2000 , at 58, 62 (concluding, after surveying mixed-motive cases in the Eleventh Circuit, that "[t]he only real difference between these cases is the panel deciding them"). Hankins's ex amination of the jurisprudence in this area suggests that the direct evidence standard, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, "is really no standard at all, akin to the 'I know it when I see it' standard that has been applied (and misapplied) to pornography for years." Id. at 62 (foot note omitted).
162. See supra notes 42, 51; cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Courts will also be required to make the often subtle and difficult distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstantial' evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Addition of a second burden shifting mechanism ... is not likely to lend clarity to the process.").
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The above instructions depart in a number of ways from the way most courts approach disparate treatment claims. First, the instruc tions assume, contrary to the Wa tson decision,1 63 that the ambiguous legislative record does not preclude using the CRA's motivating factor provision - § 2000e-2(m) -as the standard for all disparate treat ment claims. The instructions also implement Congress's intent to render liable all employers who consider an impermissible factor,1 64 and, for reasons explained below, the instructions abandon the direct evidence requirement. Finally, because the motivating factor provision serves as the touchstone for the instructions, and because Congress at tached the same-decision defense to all claims under the motivating factor provision, the instructions make the same-decision defense available in all cases.
These instructions implement a number of changes that would aid jurors in grasping the difficult and complicated issues involved in em ployment discrimination cases.1 65 Adopting the motivating factor pro vision as a uniform standard reduces the costs to litigants and courts, who would no longer struggle with the vagaries of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and its enigmatic intersection with mixed-motive claims. The pretext analysis of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would remain relevant, but only insofar as the burden-shifting scheme allows plaintiffs to show that an impermissible consideration was a motivat ing factor.
In accordance with the text of the statute and the legislative his tory, the proposed instructions dispense with Justice O'Connor's di rect evidence requirement. First, this requirement is not relevant be cause the text of the statute makes no reference to "direct evidence." Moreover, it is reasonable to infer from Congress's silence that it did not intend to codify Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement in mixed-motive cases. The vast number of Congresspersons in 1991 were almost certainly "blissfully unaware"1 66 that direct evidence was 166. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 32 (stating that, when considering bills, legislators are often "blissfully unaware" of issues that later spring up in litigation).
even an issue in the area of mixed-motive discrimination. Most of the legislators focused their energies on other portions of the Act, and few likely realized that Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement had become a prerequisite to mixed-motive claims.1 67 Ignorant of the requirement, then, Congress assuredly did not intend to codify it in the statute. Similarly, many legislators -few of whom, if any, were em ployment law experts -may not have realized the differences be tween the mixed-motive approach they were enacting and the complex burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. The "in tent" of the 102nd Congress on this issue, therefore, is opaque at best.
The proposed instructions adhere not only to the CRA's text but also to its spirit and purpose. The stated aim of the legislation was "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate pro tection to victims of discrimination."168 The CRA falls in a line of civil rights laws designed to afford broad protections against discrimina tion, and courts generally construe such laws in a liberal fashion.1 69 169. Congress itself attempted to codify this canon of liberal construction in the failed Act of 1990. Section 1107(a) of that legislation read: "All Federal laws protecting the civil rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the intent of such laws, and shall be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide effective remedies. " See S. REP. No. 101-315, pt. I, at 4 (1990) . Explaining this provi sion, a Senate Report stated:
Departure from the established rules of statutory construction, such as the rule favoring broad construction of civil rights laws, interferes with the ability of Congress to express its will through legislation .... When the terms of such a statute are susceptible to several al ternative interpretations, the courts, consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting that law, are to select the construction which most effectively advances the underlying congres sional purpose to provide equal opportunity and to provide effective remedies.
s. REP. No. 101-315, pt. I, at 57-58 (1990) .
Although this rule of construction was deleted from the legislation as ultimately enacted, the CRA's broad sweep nonetheless remains clear. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co. , 31 F.3d 1221 , 1235 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994 ), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995 ), reaff d in part, reinstated in part, vacated in part, rem'd, 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995 ) ("One overriding lesson the 1991 Act tutors ... is that Congress was unhappy with the increasingly parsimoni ous constructions of Title VII. Essentially, Congress forcefully reminded courts of the canon that Title VII and ADEA, as remedial statutes, are to be construed liberally to promote their welfare purposes, equality of treatment and employment opportunities."); see also Zimmer, Pretext and Mixed Motive, supra note 52, at 11. Moreover, the failure of the provi sion in the 1990 Act regarding liberal statutory construction does not diminish the fact that other courts and commentators have employed this canon in construing civil rights laws. See Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The evils against which [Title VII] is aimed are defined broadly .... Accordingly, under longstanding principles of statutory construction, the Act should 'be given a liberal interpretation ... .' "); Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio, Inc., No. 95-1078 , 1995 WL 491291, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1995 efendants' narrow reading con tradicts the well-established liberality with which we are directed to construe [Title VII]."); 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 74.08 (4th ed. 1992) ("Where employment issues come under the Civil Rights Acts liberal construction is the rule .... ").
[ Vol. 100:234 Viewed within the larger context of Title VII, the motivating factor provision sets a broad standard that affords relief to all victims of dis crimination who meet its standard, regardless of the type of evidence they adduce.1 70
Finally, the plain language of the statute in no way suggests that the motivating factor provision is limited to mixed-motive claims. Rather, it states simply that "an unlawful employment practice is es tablished" when the plaintiff shows that his or her protected trait was a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision.1 71 Reading the statute on its face and within its broader context, then, the motivating factor provision creates a uniform motivating factor test that applies in all disparate treatment cases.
B. Other Attempts to Simplify the Jury 's Task
This Note is not the first attempt to reform the pretext/mixed motive muddle. Courts, practitioners, and other commentators have sought to alleviate the confusion that two separate instructions create, but their suggestions have failed to take hold. This Section examines these efforts and concludes that, while informative, these failed at tempts are insufficiently grounded in the text of Title VII.
Many of the most cogent calls for reform and substantive sugges tions for improvement hail from the practitioners and courts who deal with the law in the trenches. In his concurrence in Miller v. Cigna Corp. ,172 Judge Greenberg bemoaned that employment discrimination law is "cursed with elusive terms like 'mixed motives' and 'pretext,' " and he proposed dispensing with the "unhelpful monikers" alto gether.1 73 The Judge first examined the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,174 concluding that Hazen had abandoned the notion of an independent category of mixed-motive cases.1 75 Judge Greenberg also stated that the Hazen Court expressed discomfort with 172. 47 F.3d 586, 599 (3d Cir. 1995) (Greenberg, J., concurring).
Id.
174. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a dis parate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome."). Biggins, a sixty-two-year-old terminated employee, alleged that Hazen Paper had violated both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA'') and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") when it fired him in order to prevent his pension benefits from vesting. See id. at 606-07. The Court stated that although an employee's age and his or her years of experience may correlate, they are "analytically distinct" characteristics. Id. at 611. The Court held that Biggins's benefits were close to vesting because of his years of service, not because of his age, and that the employer's decision to terminate him because of his years of service did not, without more, violate the ADEA. Id.
175.
Miller, 47 F.3d at 603 (Greenberg, J., concurring (Greenberg, J., concurring) 179. Id. at 605-06. Unfortunately, Judge Greenberg dropped a final footnote that seem ingly reinstated the separate category of mixed-motive cases he declared had been abol ished. He stated that a "limited category" of Price Waterhouse cases remained intact, ex plaining that such cases exist where the record shows not only that the employer's motives were mixed, but also that the plaintiffs evidence is sufficiently direct to shift the burden of the same-decision defense to the defendant. Id. at 606 & n.4. Judge Greenberg did not ad dress the CRA of 1991, nor did he examine the roots of the direct evidence requirement he invoked. It is unclear how his "limited category" of Price Waterhouse cases differs from the broader category of mixed-motive claims that he purportedly eliminated. 180. 958 F.2d 1176 180. 958 F.2d , 1183 180. 958 F.2d -85 (2d Cir. 1992 [Vol. 100:234 tected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's deci sion. If the plaintiff discharges his or her burden, the jury then deter mines whether the employer prevails on its affirmative same-decision defense.184
The Ty ler court noted that the last step of McDonnell Douglas Burdine -where the plaintiff persuades the trier of fact either that a discriminatory reason actually motivated the employer or that the em ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of belief -is functionally equivalent to the plaintiff's initial burden under Price Waterhouse.185 The only difference between the two, the court explained, is that the mixed-motive plaintiff begins by focusing on the discrimination itself, while the pretext plaintiff begins by focusing on his or her qualifica tions.186 In other words, the more focused proof of discrimination pre sented by a mixed-motive plaintiff allows him or her to bypass the bulk of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis, but the two modes of proof ultimately end up in the same place. Since McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and Price Waterhouse are simply different routes to the same destination, the Ty ler court stated that the two methods of proof can be boiled down to two central components for the purposes of jury instructions: (1) the motivating factor test and (2) the same decision defense.187
Several circuits explicitly recognize the confusion the pretext/mixed-motive distinction creates for juries and have taken steps to simplify their jury instructions. The Eighth Circuit's Commit tee on Model Civil Jury Instructions, for example, adopted Ty ler's ap proach for many types of disparate treatment claims.188 Although the Committee acknowledged the feasibility of separate instructions for pretext and mixed-motive claims, it expressed concern with the diffi culty courts face in attempting to classify a given case.189 As a result, 184. Ty ler, 958 F.2d at 1185.
Id.
186. Id. Once a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine plaintiff establishes that she is a member of a protected class, she first must show that she applied for a position for which she was qualified. See supra text accompanying note 17. 187. Id. at 1187. Tindall, supra note 52, at 367-68, endorses the approach in Ty ler, but he notes that the test was "short-lived." Indeed, approximately three months after handing down Ty ler, the Second Circuit moved into the animus-plus camp, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text, in Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies, 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992). There the court held that, in order for circumstantial evidence to trigger a mixed motive instruction, the evidence must be "tied directly to the alleged discriminatory ani mus." Ostrowski, 968 F. the Committee devised a special set of interrogatories to elicit findings in borderline pretext/mixed-motive cases.190 Despite these interrogato ries, the distinction remained "cumbersome and potentially confus ing," and the Committee decided to endorse a motivating factor/same decision instruction for all disparate treatment claims arising under the ADEA, § 1981, § 1983, and the motivating factor provision.191 But in Title VII cases that do not fall under the motivating factor provision -presumably all pretext claims, or cases with insufficiently direct evidence -the Committee retained separate pretext instructions.192 The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar set of model jury instructions that employ a motivating factor/same-decision test and special inter rogatories, 193 and the Ninth Circuit adopted motivating factor/same decision instructions that appear to apply in all disparate treatment cases.194 Despite the efforts of courts like the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the confusing distinctions remain. As a result, practitioners and scholars also have tried their hand at streamlining the multifac eted instructions. Most notably, the American Bar Association's Liti gation Section attempted to clarify the morass by drawing a distinction between direct and indirect methods of proof. 
Id. The instructions explain that:
[d]irect evidence would include oral or written statements showing a discriminatory motiva tion for the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff. Indirect or circumstantial evidence would include proof of a set of circumstances that would allow one to reasonably believe that [race/color/national origin/gender] was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff. (Vol. 100:234 This instruction seems to apply regardless of the type of evidence ad duced -a standard simpler even than this Note's proposed standard. But then the Model Instructions muddy the water. Where the plaintiff claims her evidence is sufficiently direct, the trial judge reads Instruc tion 1.02 [2] , which defines direct evidence as "evidence of remarks or action that, if believed, directly prove that the plaintiff's [membership in a protected class] was a factor in the defendant's decision," explic itly excluding "stray remarks" from the definition. 197 Where indirect evidence is implicated, however, the court reads Instruction 1.02 [3] , which delineates the familiar prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas Burdine.198 Thus, although Instruction 1.02 [1] appears simply to ask whether the defendant intentionally discriminated, the follow-up in structions quickly cloud matters for the jury. In cases where the plain tiff presents both direct and indirect evidence, the trial court reads all three instructions, leaving the jury understandably perplexed. Finally, the instructions ignore the text of Title VII by neglecting the same decision defense, which is available to defendants under the portion of the statute -the motivating factor provision -from which the ABA borrowed in devising its instructions.
Although the ABA makes a valiant effort, the line between direct and indirect evidence remains fuzzy, and the subtle differences in the approaches, as well as the complexity of the prima facie case, befuddle the jury. Thus, no matter how clearly the court articulates the two standards, the pretext/mixed-motive distinction inevitably creates con fusion for the jurors.199 As a result, numerous practitioners, courts, and commentators advocate erasing the bewildering distinction, calling for a simplification of jury instructions in individual employment dis crimination cases. 200 Many scholars who have examined the problem propose model jury instructions that would streamline the jury charge and simplify the confusing nexus of pretext and mixed motive. Professor Kenneth Davis, for example, states that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme's formalism creates evidentiary distortions that defy common sense.201 He argues that Hicks, in discarding the pretext-only rule, eliminated any justification for retaining the complex burden-shifting mechanism, and he therefore advocates jettisoning McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and replacing it with a motivating factor test.202 Such a test, he asserts, would allow the parties to focus on the central issues -intentional discrimination and the same-decision defense -with out the additional baggage the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme carries.203
Davis does not provide a sample of his proposed instructions, but it is reasonable to assume that they would resemble current mixed motive instructions, which are, under the 1991 Act, based on a moti vating factor test. One prototype reads: This example simplifies matters for the jury, focusing its attention on the motivating factor and same-decision tests. And because it is de rived from the text of the CRA, the example closely resembles this Note's proposed instructions. But these instructions are designed only for mixed-motive cases, and they do not accommodate pretext plain tiffs who do not offer direct evidence, whatever that may be.
Other proposed instructions attempt to adhere to this formula without entirely jettisoning the distinctions between pretext and mixed-motive claims and direct and circumstantial evidence. Professor Michael Zimmer offers a hybrid method of instructing the jury that draws upon both the ABA's Model Instructions and the motivating factor test common in mixed-motive cases. 205 Where the plaintiff's case involves evidence that could be considered both direct and indirect, Zimmer proposes that the trial court first instruct the jury to decide whether the evidence does indeed constitute direct evidence of the de fendant's intent to discriminate.206 Next the court tells the jury to con sider all of the circumstantial evidence presented by either party. The jury then must decide, based on all of the evidence, whether the pro tected characteristic was a "motivating factor" in the employer's deci sion. 20 7 If the jury finds that the protected trait was a motivating factor, the plaintiff has carried her burden of proving a violation, and the de fendant is liable even if the jury accepts the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.208 Professor Zimmer's approach seems on its face to retain the dis tinction between direct and indirect evidence while presenting the dis tinction to the jury in a comprehensible fashion. In the end, however, Zimmer in fact adopts nothing more than the motivating factor test associated with mixed-motive claims under the CRA, which most courts apply only in cases involving direct evidence. The distinction between direct and indirect evidence serves no purpose in Zimmer's scheme, because the essential inquiry for the jury is the ultimate ques tion: whether the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a motivating factor. Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial ultimately makes no difference, because the jury simply determines, based on all of the evidence, whether the impermissible criterion was a motivating factor. Since the "directness" of the evidence is therefore irrelevant, Zimmer's discussion of the distinction is mere surplusage that only confuses the jury.
Despite its shortcomings, Zimmer's approach improves upon cur rent jury instructions because it focuses on the ultimate question: the motives of the employer. This Note goes a step beyond Zimmer209 -and a step farther away from case law in the Supreme Court and lower courts -in proposing instructions drawn directly from the text of the CRA.210 The motivating factor standard employed in this Note is supe rior to the standards suggested by other scholars not only because of its fidelity to congressional language, but also because it simplifies a complex area of the law that currently puzzles judges, lawyers, juries, and parties alike.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that the confusion among the lower courts over the direct evidence requirement in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases has infected the entirety of individual disparate treatment law. Faced with a requirement of dubious origins and hap hazard application, mixed-motive plaintiffs reach to the complex struc ture of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in order to cover their bases. But this sweeping approach only passes the buck to jurors, who are far less equipped to make sense of this area of law than plaintiffs' attorneys and the courts. The surest way to clear this mess is not to clarify the meaning of direct evidence, but rather to simplify the system alto gether.
This Note suggests that the pretext and mixed-motive methods of proof can be streamlined into a single standard that simply asks whether the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the defendant's employment decision. If the plaintiff can satisfy his or her motivating factor burden, the defendant is liable under the plain terms of the motivating factor provision. The defendant may then minimize its damages by proving that it would have made the same employment decision absent the impermissible consideration.
209. Elsewhere Professor Zimmer, like this Note, has urged a straightforward applica tion of the motivating factor provision to all disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII. See Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42. But in that article Zimmer did not propose a set of jury instructions, nor did he engage in the rigorous textual and leg islative history analysis that is central to this Note.
210. But as Ty ler illustrates, see supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text, the instruc tions are not entirely without support among the lower courts. In addition, other commenta tors have suggested simplifying the complexities of disparate treatment law by focusing on the ultimate issue of discrimination, without regard to the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive. For example, Malamud, supra note 16, at , advocates an open-ended standard that dispenses with McDonnell Douglas-Burdine altogether and that focuses in stead on whether the plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
